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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DEERY AND HILTON TRAVEL
SERVICES, INC.,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No. 15219

vs.
CAPITOL INTERNATIONAL
AIRI'IAYS, INC.,
Defendant and
Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
A review of Respondent's Brief reflects a maze of
supposition and conjecture as to what Capitol thought the
parties intended with respect to Charter Flight 485,
without citation to the record as to what the evidence was
and what the jury found in the trial below.
POINT I
CAPI~OL HAS CITED NO AUTHORITY REQUIRING
DEERY TO EXHAUST EVERY CONCEIVABLE ALTERNATIVE
IN DISCHARGING ITS DUTY TO MITIGATE DAMAGES

Capitol has cited a number of cases from Utah and
other jurisdictions to show that DeEry had a duty to reasonably
mitigate its damages.

With this proposition and standard

D0Bry is in total agreement,

DeBry was charged with the

duty to act reasonably to minimize its loss and the jury
Sponsored
by the S.J.
Quinneyso
Law Library.
Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
should
lLl':~'
bvul
instructed.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

However, the trial court did not instruct the jur7
that DeEry had a duty to reasonably mitigate damages.
Rather, the trial court instructed the jury that DeEry had

an absolute duty to find the cheapest alternate trans porta:~:
and to flawlessly and perfectly mitigate its damages.
The instruction in pertinent part was,

If you

find that the Plaintiff could have found a cheaper or more
economical way of flying the flight but that he failed to
do so, then the Plaintiff would not be entitled to claim
the excess damages.
10, 11.)

(R.

586, Brief of AppelL:tnt,

:J.

In other words, DeEry had the absolute duty to

find the cheapest or most economical charter flight in the
world.

If DeEry did not do so, it was to be penalized and

was, in fact,

penalized in excess of Thirteen '::":1ousand

Dollars ( $13, 0 0 0. 0 0 i .
Capitol has not cited one case to this Court, nor diG
Capitol cite any case to the trial court in support of the
standard stated in the Court's instruction.
POINT II
DEERY DID REASONABLY MITIGATE DAH.i\GES
After Capitol refused to fly the charter, DeEry sent
the tour group on Air Canada.
Canada had the cheapest tickets he could finJ

(Tr.

G~66,

first day.)
Capitol did not put on any evidence to show
cost of the .i'lir Canaua tic::-:ets was hiCjh or

th~:

unr,~·cb•'ll

1:-
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t'

~or

does Capitol's briGf contend that the cost of the Air

canada tickets was high or unrGasonable.

In short, Capitol

seems to agree that Air Canada was a "reasonable alternative".
capitol's only argument is that Air Canada was not the
cheapest and most economical alternative.

Under Capitol's

theory, DeEry should have been required to contact and fly
the Saturn flight.

(Brief of Respondent, p. 20, 21.)

Indeed, under Capitol's theory, DeEry would be required
as a matter of law to contact every air carrier without
limitation that could provide air transportation from New
York to London on November 22, 1974 and return December 9,
1974 (Ex. 3-P)

so that the cheapest and most economical

means of air carriage could be determined.

Such a requirement

cannot be supported under any test of reasonableness.
Noreovcr, the standard advocated by Capital would be applicable
and DeDry would be penalized even though DeEry had only
twenty-two (22) days to mitigate inasmuch as Capitol did not
repudiate the contract until October 30, 1974.

(R. 46,

~3.)

Such a conclusion flies in the teeth of the standard urged
by both parties and supported by all the cases that DeEry

was only requirGd to use rGasonable efforts to mitigate its
damagcs.
UndGr the instruction given by the Court, the jury had
no choice but to find the way it did on thG issue of mitigation.

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Therefore, if this Court holds that DeEry had an
absolute duty to find the cheapest alternative, DeEry's
damages would be measured by the difference between the
Capitol contract price and the Saturn flight, or Eight
Thousand One Hundred Seventy Dollars ($8,170.00).

(Brief

a:

Respondent, p. 21.) Such a holding would ignore the testix
of Mr. Sachs received by the Court over the objection of
Debry (Tr. pgs. 5, 6, 7,

8, and ll, fourth day) that the

Saturn flight was available only up to the first week of
October, 1974 (Tr. ll, fourth day)

and the fact that DeBr/s

duty to mitigate did not arise until the 30th day of Octobe:,
1974,

(the date Capitol repudiated the contract for Charter

Flight 485 by which time the Saturn charter was no longer
available.)

However, if this Court holds that DeEry had a

duty to find a reasonable alternative, the damages

should~

measured by the difference between the Capitol contract
price and the Air Canada flight or Twenty-One Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Three Dollars Twenty-Nine Cents ($21, 653. 29) ·
(Brief of Appellant, p.

8.)
POINT III

DEERY IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES AS A RESULT
OF CAPITOL'S BREACH OF ITS DUTIES AS A COMMON CARRIER
Capitol offers no rebuttal to and apparently chooses
ignore the jury's damage award based upon DeEry's claim t~Capitol breached its duties to Deilry as a common carrier.
Apparently, Capitol concedes that claim.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
errors.
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capitol has not made any assignment of error on the common
carrler claim. The jury found that Capitol had breached its
duties and obligations to DeEry and that DeEry was damaged
as a result thereof.

(Brief of Appellant, p. 10; Inter-

rogatories 7. and 8.)
Since liability was predicated on the common carrier
claim by the jury, it is not necessary for this Court to
consider the contract issues.

?he Court can base its damage

award entirely on the common carrier claim.

1 I

DeEry has responded to the arguments advanced by Capitol
with respect to the contract claim in the attached Appendix.
If this Court rests liability on the common carrier claim,
the Appendix can be ignored.

If, however, this Court

determines to address the contract issues, the Appendix
should be considered.
POINT IV
DEBRY SHOULD BE Ah'ARDED REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES
Capitol argues that ".

. DeEry has misconstrued the

use of the 'bad faith' exception in allowing attorney's fees
(Brief of Respondent, pg. 22.) A recent explanation
of the rule is found in the case of Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S.
l, 35 L.Ed.2d 702, 93 S.Ct. 1943 (1973):

l I

As a common carrier, Capitol had a statutory duty to
the tour whether there was a contract or not.
49 U.S.C.A.
H374 {a) (1) (b).
Furthermore, a common carrier has a duty
under Utah law to communicate with potential passengers. A
cc)mmon carr icr cannot stand in silence when a potential
~1sscngcr rcqu~sts passage.
Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v.
11-.Jl''•:L
& Hio <3rancle Co., 60 Utah 153, 207 P. 155 (1922).
':T,~_::;-;--t-~ur~· founcl that Capitol had breached its duty as a
,~~01u;1un
C.:1pitol
kept provided
the by
deposit
Sponsored byc.H-rhcr
the S.J. Quinneywhen
Law Library.
Funding for digitization
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Although the traditional ABerican
rule ordinarily disfavors the allowance
of attorneys' fees in the absence of
statutory or contractual authorization,
federal courts, in the exercise of their
equitable powers, may award attorneys' fees
when the interests of justice so require.
Indeed, the power to award such fees 'is
part of the original authority of the
chancellor to do equity in a particular
situation,' [citation omitted], and
federal courts do not hesitate to exercise
this inherent equitable power whenever
'overriding considerations indicate the
need for such a recovery.' [citations
omitted].
Thus, it is unquestioned that a
federal court may award counsel fees to
a successful party when his opponent has
acted 'in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly,
or for oppressive reasons.' [citations
omitted]
In this class of cases, the underlying rationale of 'fee shifting' is, of
course, punitive, and the essential element
in triggering the award of fees is therefore
the existence of 'bad faith' on the part
of the unsuccessful litigant.
412 U.S. 1, 4, 5, 36 L.Ed. 2d 702, 707.
The Court went on to note:
Petitioners also contend that the award
of attorneys' fees in this case was improper
because the District Court, in denying respondent's claim for punitive damages, found that 'the
defendants, in good faith, believed that they
had a right to charge and discipline [respondent]
for his actions.'
It is clear, however, that
'bad faith' may be found, not only in actions
that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct
of the litigation.
And, as the Court of Ap
peals noted, the conduct of this particular
litigation was marked by the 'dilatory action
of the union and its officers .
412, U.S. 1, 15, 36 L.Ed.2d 702, 713 [emphasis added].

-6-by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Capitol argues that the alleged bad faith in the instant
case is "little more than run of the mill litigation
(Brief of Respondent, p.

25) and suggests that DeBry may be

guilty of bad faith due to the institution of other suits
against Capitol.

(Brief of Respondent, p. 25).

The trial

court permitted evidence of other litigation over numerous
objections of DeEry's counsel and finally a continuing
objection to the receipt of such evidence.

(Tr. 20, second

Debry thereafter took an exception concerning the

day.)

admissibility of evidence of such prior lawsuits on the
grounds that the same were not only immaterial, irrelevant
and incompetent, but were prejudicial to DeBry.

(Tr.

38,

fourth day) .
DeBry suggests that it was not "run of the mill" for
Capitol's lawyer,

M~.

Topham, during the course of this

litigation to misrepresent the facts concerning the existence
and whereabouts of the key contract between the parties.
(Tr. 17-18, third day, Brief of Appellant, p. 23.) l_/ After
two (2) years of extensive litigation, research, discovery
and in the middle of the trial, Capitol finally stipulated
that it was a common carrier.

This lengthy and expensive

~/See,

United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 412 F.Supp.
705 (1976), where the plaintiffs were awarded $200,000 in
atlorncy's fees on the grounds that the concealment of
certain materials were part of a course of conduct adopted
(the defendant] in bad faith for the sole purpose of
iny the final resolution of the controversy.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-7Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

litigation could have been shortened and more easily

resol~

had Capitol "fessed up" in the beginning.
DeEry further suggests that it was not "run of the
mill" for Capitol to adopt the spurious defense that it was
not a common carrier when it knew full well it was and
finally in the middle of trial so stipulated. l_/
The purpose for awarding attorney's fees under such
circumstances is obvious and compelling.

There is no quest::

but that under the "American Rule" a litigant must incur anc
bear the expense of his own attorneys'

fees.

Alyeska Pipel1·

Service Co. v. Vililderness Society, 421 U.S. 240; 44 L.r:d. ::
141;

95 S.Ct. 1612

However, it goes without sayir.s

(1975).

that a wealthy litigant can, by unfair tactics, grind an
opponent into submission.

Indeed, a vexatious litigant

could very easily lose an individual case but win the war.
For example, it is entirely possible that a plaintiff coulc
win an award of only $8,170.00 at an expense of twice

~hat

sum in attorney's fees.
Capitol's bad faith conduct has unfairly prolonged ar.c
delayed this litigation.

These tactics constitute taking

~

3 I Capitol is by statutory definition a co~~on carrier.
See, Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.,\. §1301.
"'InterstJt~
air transportation', 'overseas air transportation', c-u1c1
'foreign air transportation' respectively, mean thP carr
as a cor,1mon carrier for compensation or hire .
"
[Emphasis added.]
See also, Rule ll, C.R.C.P.
-----

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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unfair advantage of the Plaintiff and serve as an abuse and
expense to the judicial system.

This Court should follow

the lead of the federal courts to penalize such conduct.
CONCLUSION
Appellant therefore submits that this Court should
grant the relief sought by the Appellant.
Respectfully submitted,

~··

WATKISS & CAMPBELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
Twelfth Floor
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 363-3300

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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APPENDIX
POINT I
THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO A BINDING AND
ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT AND THE JURY SO FOUND
As a general proposition, the formation of a contract
is determined by the existence of an offer, an acceptance
and consideration.

In the instant case, there is no question

as to the payment of consideration by DeEry and none has
been raised by Capitol:

Indeed, it is admitted that Capitol

received and retained the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00)
from DeEry (One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) to be applied
to Charter Flight 485) and that this amount was not returned
by Capitol until long after this case was instituted.
82, third day.)

(Tr.

When an offer and an acceptance are ac-

curately determined, the issue of the existence of a contract
is resolved.
The language of the Restatement of Contracts is helpful
by way of background:
An offer is the manifestation of
willingness to enter into a bargain so
made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain
is invited and will conclude it.
Restatement of Contracts 2d, §24.

On November 27, 1973, following telephone negotiations
between the parties as to points of departure, destination,
size of aircraft, price, dates and the assignment of a
C:\:HlL'r

flight number, Capitol mailed a contract form drafted

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
A-l
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

by Capitol with a covering letter to DeBry with all blanks
filled in by Capitol, except for the signature blocks. (E::.
2-P and 3-P) On November 30, 1973 DeBry executed and returned the contract together with a covering letter.

(Ex.

4-P.) Capitol kept the deposit but did not return a signed
copy of the contract.
DeBry in any way.

In fact, Capitol did not respond

~

Capitol now contends that since it did

not execute the contract, the contract was never consummate:
between the parties.

(Brief of Respondent, Point

I.)

The language of the contract and the negotiations
between the parties belies Capitol's contentions and the
transactions between these parties reflects a classic case
of contract formation.

Capitol's signature was never

necessary to give rise to a binding contract, nor did
Capitol ever condition the contract upon such a requirement.
Capitol made a firm offer to DeBry on november 27, 1973 as
previously confirmed to DeBry and DeBry unconditionally
accepted the same by executing the contract and returning

1:

to Capitol within the ten (10) day period required by
Capitol before the offer expired or was withdrawn. !_/
The contract form prepared by Capitol with respect tc
Charter Flight 485 states in part ".

the carrier will

charter to the Charterer and the Charterer will take on
charter for the flight,

joc.rney, service or period and up.'::

the terms specified in the Schedule subject to the Condlt:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
l I
R.Library
J. Services
Daumand Construction
v. State
Child,
Technology Act, administeredCo.
by the Utah
Library. 122 l:t.Jh 104,
P":"""2d 817
1952)Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
0
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_:

set out on the back hereof, to which the Charterer hereby
agrees and accepts .

. if this contract is not signed and

returned with the full deposit indicated in the Schedule of
Payments as indicated ten (10) days after issue, the offer
of Charter Transportation, as indicated, shall automatically
expire.

[Emphasis added.)

(Ex.

3-P, first page.)

At

the time of DeEry's acceptance of Capitol's offer by the
execution of the contract prepared by Capitol, a binding
contract existed between the parties and the jury so found.
(Brief of Appellant, page 9; Interrogatories 1. and 2.)
While there is no requirement in contract law that an offer
must be signed by the offeror, although DeEry submits that
the execution by Capitol of its letter (Ex. 2-P) would
fulfill such a requirement, the fact is that the offer in
the instant case does not condition DeEry's acceptance upon
Capitol's ratification, signature or other approval.

After

DeBry accepted Capitol's offer in the specified manner,
Capitol lost the power to vary the manner in which its offer
must be accepted and cannot now require ratification or home
office approval of DeEry's acceptance.

See, generally,

Corbin on Contracts, I Vol. Ed., §38-39

(1952).

In the present case, Capitol's Aircraft Charter Contract was filled in by Capitol and transmitted to DeEry by
an officer of capitol authorized to make contracts.

It is

fundamental that DeEry had the power to accept Capitol's

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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offer by executing the

contr~ct

and returning the same

within the period required which is exactly what DeBry die.
The case of
Blow

&

~orton

& Lamphere Construction Co. v.

Cote, Inc., 183 .-,. 2d, 230

(1962)

is squarely in

point. In that case the plaintiffs were partners in a sand
and gravel business, and defendant was a contractor.
Defendant received a sizeable contract award for a road
construction job.

Plaintiffs thereupon contacted defendant

with respect to furnishing the crushed gravel which defer.:,·
would require in his road construction.
After some preliminary negotiations defendant wrote t:.:
following letter to plaintiff:
Norton & Lamphere Canst. Co.
P.O. Box 46, Jericho, Vermont
Gentlemen:
\ve enclose herewith throe copies of contract Hhl:
have been revised per your request.
The original and copy should be signed by you Jr.
returned to this office.
At which time, we
will sign the original and return it to you.
The third copy, which is marked, should be retained for your files.
V~r~·

truly yours,

BLOW & COTE, INC.
(Dennis Cote)
The contract form

att~ched

to that letter set out

certain specific~tions ~nd estim~tes for m~teri~ls, i~~:.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a completion date.
spaces.

The form contained blank signature

The plaintiff executed and mailed the contract to

the defendant.

However, the defendant did not execute nor

affix his signature on the agreement. Following a dispute,
plaintiff sued for breach of contract.

The defendant

contended that since he did not execute the agreement he
was not bound.

The court answered that contention as

follows:
In the instant case, however, we do have a
written contract, containing terms, which the
evidence discloses, had been fully
agreed upon by both parties.
Drawn by the
defendant, who now seeks to deny it, it was sent
to the plaintiff who affixed its signature to
it, thus accepting it. While the defendant did
not sign the contract, as it had agreed to do,
the fact is that it had already accepted the
terms expressed therein and had itself reduced
them to writing.
The accepting and adopting of
a written contract by a party who has not put
his name to it, binds such party equally as if
he had signed such contract.
When this contract
was accepted by the plaintiff, under the circumstances existing here, it became binding upon
both parties, the same as if it had been signed
by both.
[citations ommitted]
The fact that
the defendant believed that such contract would
not be binding upon it without its signature is
of no consequence.
It is a general rule of construction of contracts that the language and
acts of a party to a contract are to receive such
a construction as the other party was fairly
justified in giving to them, and he will not, at
a later time, be permitted to give them a different
operation in consequence of some mental reservation.
Viewing the transaction between the parties
from a different aspect, the defendant, by reason
of its letter and proposed contract sent to the
plaintiff, made plaintiff an offer.
The plaintiff
by signing the proposed contract, accepted the
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offer.
The effect of the acceptance by the
plaintiff was to make the offer into a binding
contract between the parties. [citations omitt~dj
183 A.2d 230, 234,

(1962).

[Emphasis added.]

See also Corbin on Contracts, §30
Onyx Oil and Chemical Co.,

218 F.2 d,

(1950), Smith v.

104

(1955); and .1'1tlc2:_'_

Banana Co. v. Standard Fruit and Steamship Co ..
555,

(1974)

493 F.2d

0

The case here under consideration is even stronger t'la:.
the Norton case.

In both cases the defendants failed or
I

refused to sign the contracts at issue.

However, signifi2a:::

differences exist in the cover letters representing
of the respective offers.

deli~~

In :\lorton the cover letter stat2i,

"The original and copy should be signed by you and retun.oc
to this office.

At which time we will sign the original

and return it to you."

(Emphasis added.)

It can be persuao.

argued in Norton that the parties anticipated the addi tio:'a~
act of the defendant's signature after the plaintiffs had
signed.
In the instant case the cover letter spoke in terms
finality.
fact,

o: ,

No additional act was anticipated or required; ;:

the contracts were not only requested, but

confir~ec

between Capitol and DeEry prior to submission.
. Here arc the contracts request~d
and confirmed in my telephone convers:1tion
with ShL!ron .
. I am :J.bL' to hold the<'
dates

onl~·

to

Deccmlj~r

5,

so

their execution dnd r,•turn .

plc~sc

CX!t~d~t~

(]:>: .

..:-!)
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l\-6

In this case, the intention of the parties is clear
that a binding contract was contemplated between them.
Capital prepared, enclosed and confirmed its existence and
DeBry accepted the same, paid the required consideration and
reaffirmed its intention to fly Charter Flight 485.
P and 8-P.)

(Ex.

7-

A review of the record can support no other

conclusion.
Notwithstanding the hue and cry now raised by Capitol,
the essential elements of contract formation were clearly
present in the instant case and the jury so found.
POINT II
C.A.B. REGULATIONS DO NOT CHANGE
OR ABROGATE THE COM1'10N LAW OF cmlTRACTS
NOR DID DEERY BP£ACH THE CONTRACT
The main thrust of Capitol's brief is that the regulations of the Civil Aeronautice Board prevent the enforcement
of the contract and the DeEry failed to comply with those
regulations.
While there is no question as to the right of the Civil
Aeronautice Board to promulgate regulations to govern air
carriers, the Act implementing that authority contains
specific statutory provisions with respect to available
remedies and provides as follows:
Section 1506.

Remedies Not Exclusive.

Nothing contained in this Chapter shall in any
way abridge or alter the remedies now existing
at conunon L•w or by statute but the provisions
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of this Chapter are in addition to such remedies.
(Public Law Citation omitted) [emphasis added.]
49 U.S.C.A. §1506.
\'/hat Capitol is urging this Court to do,

is to

substlt~:

for the common law of contracts a new law of contracts as
dictated by the Federal Civil Aeronautics Board.

This

position is urged notwithstanding the plain language of th•
Federal statute that the regulations cannot abridge or
abrogate any common law remedy.
In essence, Capitol seeks to have this Court declare
that the regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board should
be substituted for the common law of contracts.

DeBry

submits that to permit Capitol to shield itself from liabilit
to DeBry based upon these regulations would be to permit U:2
C.A.B. to usurp the function of the judicial system in
determining the legal principles applicable to the formatioc
of contracts between parties.

Certainly, the regulations

o:

the C.A.B. do not contemplate such a result.
Even if there were some technical requirements in order
to comply with the regulations, Capitol itself could have
applied for a waiver pursuant to Section 378.30, but

appar~

chose not to do so:
378.30.

Waiver.

A waiver of any of the provisions of this
regulation may be granted by the Board upon 1ts
own initiative, or upon the submission bv

A-S
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a supplemental air carrier of a written request
therefor, provided that such a waiver is in the
public interest and it appears to the Board that
special or unusual circumstances warrant a departure from the provisions set forth herein.
[Emphasis added.]
Capitol has argued that DeEry breached certain conditions
of the contract, thus excusing Capitol from performance.
(Brief of Respondent, p. 8.)

Specifically, Capitol contends

that DeEry did not file a ''tour prosepctus" with the Civil
Aeronautics Board.

Capitol contends that since no tour

prospectus was filed, Capitol could not fly the charter
flight.
The applicable C.A.E. regulations are as follows:
Procedure.
(a) No inclusive tour or series of
tours shall be operated, nor shall any tour
oeprator or foreign tour operator sell, or offer
to sell, or solicit persons to participate in, or
otherwise advertise such tour or tours, or receive
any money from any prospective participant in
connection therewith, until at least fifteen days
after he and the direct air carrier have jointly
filed with the Board (Supplemenatry Services
Division, Bureau of Operating Rights), in duplicate
a tour prospectus, satisfying the requirements of
Section 378.13.
[Emphasis added.]
C.A.B. Regulation 378.10
The prospectus shall be filed in duplicate and
shall include two copies of the following:
The
charter contract, the contract between the tour
operator or foreign tour operator and tour participants, the tour operator's .
. surety bond
. and, where applicable, two copies of
the depository agreement with a bank .
C.A.D. Regulation 378.13

A-9
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Capitol's argument is very curious.

§378.10 of the

Regulation states that this must be a "joint" filing.

The

record shows that Capitol refused to communicate with DeBr]'
for nearly ten months, and further, DeBry requested

materia~'

from Capitol for the filing but Capitol refused to respond
or provide filing materials.

(Ex. 9-P and llP.)

It is not

clear how DeBry was supposed to individually do a "joint"
filing when Capitol refused to even communicate with DeBry,
Indeed, §378.13 of the Regulation provides that the
initial document required for such a filing is "the

char~r

contract". DeBry could not even begin the filing process
because Capitol had the contract.

In fact,

ten months after

DeBry signed the contract, Capitol's lawyer stated, "I have
been unable .

. to locate any contract forms for the

proposed flights."

(Ex. 26-P.)

This Court has recently observed that:

"We accept the

correctness of the proposition that there is implied in any
contract a covenant of good faith and cooperation, which
should prevent either party from impeding the other's
performance of his obligations thereunder and that one part;
may not render it difficult or impossible for the other W
continue performance and then take advantage of tho nonperformance he has caused." Zions Propc>rtics, Inc. v.~'
538 P. 2d 1319 (Utah 1975).
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i

Capitol should not be permitted to hinder or impede the
c.A.B.

filing, and then be excused from its contractual

obligations because no filing was made.
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that two

(2) copies of the foregoing

Reply Brief of Appellant DeBry and Hilton Travel Services,
Inc. were served upon the Defendant and Respondent, Capitol
International Airways, Inc. by mailing the same, postage
prepaid, to Philip R. Fishler, Strong & Hanni, 605 Boston
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

~ay

of

November, 1977.
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ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES TO SUPPLEMENT
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Point I, Page 2
The instruction given by the trial court was, at best, confusing,
misleading and indeed improper.

1

Under such circumstances, the general

rule is that is is error to give instructions which tend to mislead
or confuse the jury.

See, 88 C.J.S. Trial §338, 75 Am.Jur.2d §624,

and 1 Reid Branson, Instructions to Juries, 3d Ed., §104.
has followed the general rule since 1917.

This Court

Sorenson v. Bell, 51 Utah

262, 170 P. 72 (1917), and Lund v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 12
Utah 2d 268, 365 P.2d 633 (1961).

In Sorenson, the Supreme Court

opined:
The district court no doubt had in mind correct
principles of law when it framed the instruction,
but in stating those principles it used language
which cast a burden on plaintiffs which the law
does not require of them.
The instruction is therefore clearly erroneous. [Emphasis added] 170 P. 72,74.
In the instant case, as in

Sorenso~

the instruction given by the

trial court placed a burden on DeBry which the law does not require,
i.e., that DeBry find the cheapest and most economical flight, and that
failing, DeBry could not recover excess damages.
The test for the correctness of an instruction does not lie in
the indulgence which a lawyer in his office, with the aid of his books,
or the trial and appellate courts with the benefit of briefs and

l

R. 586, previously cited as Instruction No. 20, now designated as
Instruction No. 2 8.
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arguments of counsel, give to instructions, but as to how the instructions will naturally be understood by average men composing juries.
88 c.J.S. Trial §338, pp.

894-895.

Here the jury concluded that

DeEry could not recover the full amount of the damages it sustained
and the jury could have reached no other conclusion under the incorrect mandate given by the trial court.
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